Contents

Part I Jurisprudence of Contemporary International Economic Law

L	OII	the Marginanty, Comprehensiveness, and independence						
	of Iı	f International Economic Law Discipline						
	1.1	Narrow Interpretation: IEL as a Novel Branch						
		of Public International Law	4					
	1.2	Broad Interpretation: IEL as Marginal Synthesis						
		of International Laws and National Laws That Adjust						
		Cross-Border Economic Relations	5					
	1.3	Analysis Towards the Above Two Groups of Viewpoints	6					
	1.4	Connection and Difference Between International						
		Economic Law and Public International Law	17					
	1.5	Connection and Difference Between International						
		Economic Law and Private International Law	18					
	1.6	Connections and Differences Between International						
		Economic Law and Domestic Economic Law	20					
	1.7	Connections and Differences Between International						
		Economic Law and International Business Practices	24					
	Ann	ex: Schematic Diagrams of the Mutual Relation as Between						
	Inter	national Economic Law and Other Neighboring Legal Departments	27					
		Integrated Diagram	27					
		Decomposed Diagrams	28					
	Refe	erences	28					
2	On i	the Misunderstandings Relating to China's Current						
•		elopments of International Economic Law Discipline	31					
	2.1	So-Called Nonscientific or Nonnormative	32					
	2.2	So-Called Polyphagian or Avaricious	35					
	2.3	So-Called Fickle Fashion or Stirring Heat	36					
	2.4	So-Called Duplicating Version or Importing Goods	38					
	Refe	erences	43					

xiv Contents

3	Heg	emony	rce, Essence of "Yellow Peril" Doctrine and Its Latest "Variant"—The "China Threat" Doctrine: From the	
		•	e of Historical Mainstream of Sino-foreign Economic	
	Inte	raction	s and Their Inherent Jurisprudential Principles	4
	3.1	Introd	uction: Is "China Threat Doctrine" History or Reality,	
		Fabric	ation or Truth?	4
	3.2	Origin	and Essence of "Yellow Peril Doctrine"	4
		3.2.1	1870s Version of "Yellow Peril" and "China Threat"	
			by Tsar Russia	5
		3.2.2	1890s Version of "Yellow Peril" and "China Threat"	
			by the German Empire	5
		3.2.3	Primitive Version of "Yellow Peril" and "China Threat"	
			by American Hegemonism from the Middle	
			Nineteenth Century to the Late Twentieth Century	5
		3.2.4	Revised Version of "Yellow Peril" and "China Threat"	
			by American Hegemonism Since the Twenty-First	
			Century, with the Inheritance from and Development	
			to Its Predecessors	6
	3.3	Back t	to Historical Truth: The Long-Standing Mainstream	
		of Sin	o-Foreign Economic Interactions and Their Inherent	
			rudential Principles	6
		3.3.1	China's Present National Policy of Opening Up	
			Is the Flourish and Development of Its Fine	
			Traditions in History	6
		3.3.2	Ancient China's External Economic Interaction	
			and Its Jurisprudential Principles	7
		3.3.3	Semicolonial and Semifeudal China's External Economic	
			Interaction and Its "Jurisprudential" Principles	8
		3.3.4	Socialist China's External Economic Interaction	
			and Its Jurisprudential Principles	8
		3.3.5	China's Peaceful Rising and Its Long-Term Peaceful	
			Foreign Policy Are Historically Inevitable	9
	3.4		uding Remarks: Respecting Historical Truth	
			eaching Consensus	9
	Refe	rences.		9
Part	+ TT	Crost	Debates on Contemporary Economic Sovereignty	
1 al i	. 11	Great	Debates on Contemporary Economic Sovereignty	
4	The	Three	Big Rounds of US Unilateralism Versus WTO	
	Mul	tilatera	alism During the Last Decade: A Combined Analysis	
	of th	ie Grea	t 1994 Sovereignty Debate Section 301 Disputes	
	(199	8-2000) and Section 201 Disputes (2002–2003)	10
	4.1	Introd	uction	10
	4.2	_	on of the Section 201 Disputes: US Unilateralism	
		and So	overeignty	10

Contents xv

	4.3		ts of Sovereignties in the Formation of the WTO System	111
	4.4		fraction of Such Conflicts in the United States:	110
			reat 1994 Sovereignty Debate"	113
		4.4.1	Away with the "S" Word: [Sovereignty	114
		4.4.0	of Other States]!	114
		4.4.2	Never Away with the US "S" Word: ["Sovereignty"	115
		4.4.2	(Hegemony) of the United States!]	115
		4.4.3	The "Contradiction" and Coordination Between	101
		4.4.4	"Spear" and "Shield"	121
	4.5	4.4.4	Some Discussions on "Double Standards," etc	122
	4.5		reat 1994 Sovereignty Debate" and Section 301	125
	4.6		EU Economic Sovereignty Disputes Caused	4.20
		•	ion 301: Origin and Prelude	128
		4.6.1	US-Japan Auto Disputes	129
		4.6.2	US-E.C. Banana Disputes	130
		4.6.3	US-E.C. Section 301 Dispute	133
	4.7		–EU Economic Sovereignty Disputes Caused	
		•	ion 301: Claims and Rebuttals	135
		4.7.1	The Claims of the E.C. Representatives	135
		4.7.2	The Rebuttals of the United States	138
	4.8		ΓO/DSB Panel Report on the Section 301 Case	140
	4.9		uivocal Law-Enforcing Image Concluded from	
			el Report	142
		4.9.1	The Panel Creates a Limit for Its Own Duty, Is Overly	
			Cautious, Dares Not to Transgress the "Mine Bounds,"	
			and Is Irresponsible for Its Duties	143
		4.9.2	The Panel Hovers Between the "Two Powers"	
			in Its Attempt to Ingratiate Itself with Both Sides	144
		4.9.3	The Panel Leaves the Offender at Large, Criticizing	
			Pettily While Doing It Great Favor	146
		4.9.4	The Panel Is Partial to and Pleading for Hegemony	
			and Thus Leaves a Lot of Suspicions	
			and Hidden Perils	147
	4.10		maining Suspicions and Latent Perils Entailed	
		by the I	Panel Report	148
		4.10.1	The First Suspicion and Latent Peril	148
		4.10.2	The Second Suspicion and Latent Peril	150
		4.10.3	The Third Suspicion and Latent Peril	151
		4.10.4	The Fourth Suspicion and Latent Peril	153
	4.11	Conclus	sion	156
	Refer	ences		158
5	On th	ne Imnlia	cations for Developing Countries	
J		_	1994 Sovereignty Debate" and the EC-US	
			vereignty Disputes	159
			vereighty Disputes	163
	TCICI			103

xvi Contents

Part III	China's Strategic Position on Contemporary International
	Economic Order Issues

What Should be China's Strategic Position in the Establishment					
		lew International Economic Order? With Comments			
		Neoliberalistic Economic Order, Constitutional Order			
		ne WTO, and Economic Nationalism's Disturbance			
		lobalization	167		
	6.1	Introduction: International Economic Order, International			
		Economic Law, the Global South-North Contradiction,			
		and China's Strategic Position	168		
	6.2	China's Self-Positioning in History	170		
		6.2.1 Self-Positioning of Ancient China	170		
		6.2.2 Self-Positioning of Modern China	171		
		6.2.3 Mainstream National Consciousness Developed			
		from Post-Opium War for More Than 160 Years			
		and Its Influence on China's Self-Positioning	172		
	6.3	China's Self-Positioning in the Future: To Be One			
		of the Driving Forces and Mainstays for the Establishment			
		of the NIEO	174		
	6.4	Comprehensive and Accurate Understanding of Deng Xiaoping's			
		28-Word Foreign Policy Is a Must for Scientifically			
		Establishing China's Position	176		
	6.5	Brief Comments on Theories of Contemporary International	170		
	0.5	Economic Order and China's Positioning	190		
		6.5.1 Neoliberalistic Economic Order	190		
		6.5.2 Constitutional Order of the WTO	196		
		6.5.3 Economic Nationalism's Disturbance of Globalization	200		
	6.6	Conclusions	203		
			203		
	Kere	erences	204		
7	A R	eflection of the South-South Coalition in the Last Half			
		tury from the Perspective of International Economic			
	Law	making: From Bandung, Doha, and Cancún to Hong Kong	207		
	7.1	Introduction	207		
	7.2	From Bandung to Hong Kong: The South–South Coalition			
		Progresses Unevenly	209		
		7.2.1 The Bandung Conference Among the South–South			
		Countries: The First Asian–African Conference	209		
		7.2.2 The Group of 77 Among the South Countries	210		
	7.3	The Fresh Countenance and Forthcoming Obstacles			
		of the South–South Coalition in the Doha–Cancún Process	214		
	7.4	The Status Quo and Prospects for the South–South Coalition			
		from Cancún to Hong Kong	218		
		7.4.1 The Multilateral Negotiations Are in Stagnation	210		
		After the Cancún Deadlock	218		
		1 HOI HIC CHICHII DOUGIOCK	210		

Contents xvii

		7.4.2	The Prospect of the South–North Multilateral	
			Negotiation Grows Brighter	219
		7.4.3	The South–North Multilateral Negotiation Again Dims	220
		7.4.4	The Positive Fruits of the Hong Kong Conference	
			with Heavy Negative Comments: Shown Up After	
			Numerous Appeals but Still Half-Masked	227
		7.4.5	New Highlights in the South–North Conflict: Judicial	
			Breakthrough in Recently Litigated WTO Agricultural	
			Disputes	232
	7.5	Assess	sment of the Trend After the Hong Kong Conference	
		in the	Light of the Historical Track of the South–South	
		Coalit	ion During the Last 50 Years	233
		7.5.1	The Historical "6C" Track of South–North Conflicts	
			and Its Characteristics	233
		7.5.2	To Doha Round's Success: No Way Except Through	
			the Tenacious South–South Coalition	235
	Refe	erences.		238
•	C		I CLEEK I WEEK I COLOR	
8			sprudential Thoughts upon WTO's Law-Governing,	241
			ng, Law-Enforcing, Law-Abiding, and Law-Reforming	241
	8.1		's Age in the WTO Having Reached Full	2.42
	0.0		Entered 10	242
	8.2		and Its Related International Economic Relationships	2.42
			Be Governed by Law	242
	8.3		ule" Embedded in the Law-Making Process of IEL	
			e Past 60 Years	243
	8.4		onships Among Law-Making, Law-Abiding and	
			Reforming of the WTO and Its "Rules of Game"	245
		8.4.1	Should International Weak Groups Wholly Deny	
			or Entirely Accept Existed WTO and Its "Rules	
			of Game" at All?	246
		8.4.2	Is Law-Reforming of the WTO and Its "Rules of Game"	
			Nothing but a "Political Challenge"?	246
	8.5		WTO's Law-Enforcing Body DSB "Bao Qingtian"	
			Field of International Economy?	248
		8.5.1	The "Congenital Deficiency" of the WTO's	
			Law-Enforcing Body DSB	249
		8.5.2	The "Postnatal Imbalance" of the WTO's	
			Law-Enforcing Body DSB	252
	8.6		tain Goodness and Avoid Harmfulness in Law-Abiding	
			aw-Adapting, to Promote Law-Reforming and Strengthen	
			eak Through South–South Coalition	254
	8.7		ed and Tough Path for Weak Groups to Promote	
			Reforming and Strengthen Themselves Up, yet a Bright	
		Prospe	ect Through Advancing with Time	258

xviii Contents

		8.7.1	Rugged and Tough Path for Weak Groups to Promote	
			Law-Reforming and Their Accumulated Achievements During 1947–2000	258
		8.7.2	Rugged and Tough Path for Weak Groups to Promote Law-	230
		0.7.2	Reforming During 2001: Present and Their Bright Future	264
	8.8	Drief	Conclusions	267
			Conclusions	268
	Kere	rences.		200
Par	t IV	Diver	gences on Contemporary Bilateral Investment Treaty	
9			Four "Great Safeguards" in Sino-foreign BITs	
			Dismantled? Comments on Critical Provisions	
	Con		g Dispute Settlement in Model US and Canadian BITs	273
	9.1		rovisions Concerning Dispute Settlement in the Chinese	
			and Their Correspondence with Relevant Provisions	
			ICSID Convention	274
	9.2		tial Provisions Concerning Dispute Settlement in US	
			anadian Model Bits	279
	9.3		Should Not Hastily Accept the Above US and Canadian	
			sions or Their Variations When Negotiating	202
			r Concluding BITs	282
		9.3.1	Such Provisions Deviate from the Rights Authorized	202
		022	to Host Countries by International Conventions	282
		9.3.2	Such Provisions Do Not Match China's Current	200
		9.3.3	Circumstances	288
		9.3.3	Such Provisions Ignore the Bitter Lessons of Some Bits Harming Weak Countries: The Warning	
			from Argentina's Dilemma	295
		9.3.4	Such Provisions Ignore the Latest Legislative Track-Shift	293
		7.5.₹	in Two Host Countries: Argentina and the United States	298
	9.4	Sugge	estions for Future Sino-foreign BIT Negotiations	302
	<i>,</i>	9.4.1	Strengthening Investigation and Research on Recent	302
		, <u>.</u>	Developments in BIT Practice and Acting	
			with High Caution	302
		9.4.2	Using Well the Authorizations of Relevant Conventions	
			and Firmly Holding onto the Four Great Safeguards	303
		9.4.3	Insisting on "Never Repeat" and Timely "Mending	
			the Fold After Some Sheep Have Been Lost"	304
	Refe	erences.	-	306
10	Dist	inguish	ning Two Types of Countries and Properly Granting	
_ •		_	Reciprocity Treatment: Re-comments on the Four	
			s in Sino-Foreign BITs Not to Be Hastily	
			letely Dismantled	309
	10.1		ground	310
	10.2		or Viewpoints in "The First Comments"	313

Contents xix

	10.3		New Thoughts for Future Sino-Foreign	215
			gotiations	315
		10.3.1	8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8	
			on Recent Internal and External Developments	215
			and Acting with High Caution	315
		10.3.2	Using Well the Authorizations of the Relevant	
			Conventions and Firmly Uphold the Four Great	
			Safeguards	316
		10.3.3	Distinguishing Two Kinds of Countries, Granting	
			Differential Reciprocity, Excluding or Limiting	
			the Application of MFN to International	
			Dispute Settlement Procedures	317
	10.4		eoretical Grounds and Practical Precedents	
			opting Differential Treatment Based	
			Distinguishing Two Types of Countries	324
		10.4.1	Differential Treatment Conforms to the Universal	
			Philosophy of "Analyze Issues Under Their Concrete	
			Situations"	324
		10.4.2	Differential Treatment Conforms to the Basic	
			Jurisprudence of "Equity and Mutual Benefit"	324
		10.4.3	Differential Treatment Conforms to the Basic	
			International Law Principle of Supremacy	
			of State Sovereignty	326
		10.4.4	Differential Treatment Conforms to the Evolution	
			of the Principle of MFN Treatment	327
		10.4.5	Differential Treatment and Exclusion or Limitation	
			of the Application of MFN Treatment to the Dispute	
			Settlement Procedures Conforms to the Latest	
			Repeated Warnings from UNCTAD	329
		10.4.6	Differential Treatment Conforms to the Current	
			International Arbitration Practices	330
		10.4.7	The Precedents of Granting Differential	
			Treatment and Excluding or Limiting the Application	
			of MFN Clause	332
	10.5	Conclu	sion	333
	Refer	ences		334
11	Ouer	ies to th	e Recent ICSID Decision on Jurisdiction	
•	_		se of Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru:	
	-		a–Peru BIT 1994 Be Applied to Hong Kong	
			he "One Country, Two Systems" Policy?	337
	11.1		ction: Summary of the Dispute	338
	11.2		ssues and Basic Academic Views	339
	11.2	11.2.1	Main Issues.	339
		11.2.1	Basic Academic Views	340
		11.2.2	Three Aspects of Queries	340
		11.2.3	Times rispects of Queries	540

xx Contents

	11.3		s upon Applicability of China–Foreign BITs to Chinese	2.41
			als with the Right of Abode in Hong Kong	341
		11.3.1	Historical Overview of Hong Kong Before	241
		11 2 2	and After Its Return to China	341
		11.3.2	The China–British Joint Declaration	342
		11.3.3	The Joint Liaison Group	343
		11.3.4	The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special	
			Administrative Region	344
		11.3.5	Applicability of the China–Peru BIT 1994	
			to Hong Kong Residents	352
	11.4		s upon Scope of the Arbitration Provision	
		in the C	China–Peru BIT 1994	353
		11.4.1	Historical Overview of China's Accession	
			to the ICSID Convention	353
		11.4.2	China's Policy on the Resolution of Investment	
			Treaty Disputes	356
		11.4.3	Scope and Nature of the Dispute Resolution	
			Provision in the China–Peru BIT 1994	363
	11.5	Queries	s upon the Twisted Interpretation Against Articles 31	
			of the Vienna Convention of Laws of Treaties	365
		11.5.1	How Did the Tribunal Twistingly Interpret	
			Articles 31 and 32 of VCLT?	365
		11.5.2	What Scientific Approaches Should Be Used to Find	
			True and Correct Interpretation on Articles 31 and 32	
			of VCLT per se and the Peru–China BIT 1994?	367
		11.5.3	With Respect to Key Instruments Such as Joint	
		111010	Declaration and Basic Law	367
		11.5.4	With Respect to Rules of International Law	507
		11.5.1	Applicable in the Relations Between the Parties	369
		11.5.5	With Respect to Specific Circumstances	307
		11.5.5	of the Conclusion of Peru–China BIT 1994	369
	11.6	Conclu	sion: ICSID's Decision on Case No. Arb/07/6	307
	11.0		rrect, Unreasonable, and Unacceptable	371
	Dafar			371
	Kelei	ences		3/1
12	Shou	ld "The	Perspective of South-North Contradictions"	
			ed?: Focusing on 2012 Sino-Canada BIT	373
	12.1	China's	s Scientific Position: Still a Developing Country,	
			ing to the South Camp	375
	12.2		urce and Stream of South–North Contradictions	377
		12.2.1	The Essence of Modern BIT: A Product	
			of South–North Contradiction	379
		12.2.2	Conclusion of South–North BIT: A Process of Benefits	
		-	Exchange and Mutual Compromise, Not Necessarily	
			a Process in Pursuit of "Universal Values"	380
			a 1100000 in 1 arount of Chrychoal values	200

Contents xxi

	12.3		no-Canada BIT as a Typical Example of South-North	
			s Exchange and Mutual Compromise: Focusing	
		on the "	'Expropriation and Compensation Clause'	381
		12.3.1	South–North Divergence on "Compensation	
			Standard"	383
		12.3.2	South–North Divergence on "Compensation	
			Evaluation"	384
		12.3.3	A Recent South–North Compromise on Compensation	
			for Expropriation and Its Valuation Criteria	387
	12.4		no-Canada BIT as a Typical Example of South–North	
			s Exchange and Mutual Compromise: Focusing	
		on the "	'Dispute Settlement Clause''	388
		12.4.1	South–North Divergence and Compromise on MFN	
			Treatment Exception	389
		12.4.2	South–North Divergence and Compromise	
			on Financial and Prudential Carve-Out	391
		12.4.3	South–North Divergence and Compromise	
			on Taxation Carve-Out	392
		12.4.4	South–North Divergence and Compromise	
			on the Exception of Exhaustion of Local Remedies	394
		12.4.5	South–North Divergence and Compromise	
			on the National Security Exception	396
	12.5		ound: Clear Evidence that Perspective of South–North	
			dictions Should Not Be Abandoned in the Construction	
			national Economic Rules	397
	12.6		ding Remarks	399
	12.7		Interpretation of China–Canada Bilateral Investment	
			ion Agreement by an Official from the Department	
			ty and Law of MOFCOM	400
			What Are the Main Contents of the Agreement?	400
			What Is the Significance of Signing the Agreement?	402
	Refere	ences		402
ъ.	T7 0			
Part			orary China's Legislation on Sino-Foreign	
	E	conomi	c Issues	
13	То От	on Wid	er or to Close Again: China's Foreign	
13		_	olicies and Laws	407
	13.1		82 Constitution	407
	13.1		Policies	408
	13.4	13.2.1	Coordination with China's Economic Aims	409
		13.2.1	Just Rights and Legal Profits	410
		13.2.2		
		13.2.3	Full Decision-Making Power Attraction of Foreign Investors	411 412
		13.2.4	Autaction of Poleign investors	412

xxii Contents

	13.3	Substar	ntive Laws	415
		13.3.1	Joint Venture Law	415
		13.3.2	Law of Special Economic Zones	432
		13.3.3	Economic Contract Law	437
		13.3.4	Sino-Foreign Economic Contract Law	439
		13.3.5	Trademark Law	439
		13.3.6	Patent Law	442
	13.4	Procedi	ıre Laws	446
		13.4.1	Civil Procedure Law	446
		13.4.2	Arbitration Rules	448
	13.5	Conclu	sion	451
	Refer	ences		452
1.4	Tr- C1	I A :	to an 4. On an William The City LICE	
14			in or to Open Wider: The Sino-US Economic nce and the Legal Environment for Foreign	
			China After Tiananmen	453
	14.1		gton: Most Favored Nation≠Most Favorite Nation	454
	14.1		: MFN-China, United States in the Same Boat	455
	14.2		wallows Sensitive to Climate	457
	14.3	-	wanows Sensitive to Chinatew Facets Added to the Legal	457
	14.4	14.4.1	Joint Ventures Law Amended	460
		14.4.1	Land-Tract Development Measures Promulgated	460
			Pudong: A Heart-Side Area Widely Opened	462
		14.4.3 14.4.4		402
		14.4.4	Tax Law for Foreign Investors Being Unified and Made More Preferential	463
		14.4.5	Administrative Procedure Law Enforced	464
				465
	14.5	14.4.6	ICSID System Accepted	465
	14.3	The ba	by and the Bath Water	403
15			solute Immunity from Nationalization for Foreign	
	Inves		e Enacted in China's Economic Law?	467
	15.1		s for Raising the Question	467
	15.2		fferent Views	468
	15.3	The Wi	riter's Personal Views	471
	Refer	ences		480
16	Chin	a's Speci	ial Economic Zones and Coastal Port Cities:	
			pment and Legal Framework	483
	16.1		ical Debates	484
	16.2		al Development	486
	16.3		and Dirty Water: Maturation of the Policy	491
		16.3.1	The Yang Yibang Case	492
		16.3.2	The Zhou Zhirong Case	493
		16.3.3	The Wang Zhong Case	495
	16.4		ramework	503
		16.4.1	Preferential Tax Treatments in SEZs, ETEDEZs,	- 00
			COPOCIs and CEOAs	504

		16.4.2	Labor and Wages in SEZs, ETEDEZs, COPOCIs,	
			and CEOAs	515
		16.4.3	Land Use and Management in the SEZs, ETEDEZs,	
			COPOCIs, and CEOAs	518
		16.4.4	Enterprise Registration in the SEZs, ETEDEZs,	
			COPOCIs, and CEOAs	521
		16.4.5	Technology Imports into the SEZs, ETEDEZs,	
			COPOCIs, and CEOAs	525
		16.4.6	Foreigners Entering and Leaving China's SEZs	528
		16.4.7	Economic Combination Between the SEZs et al.	
			and Inlands	529
	16.5	Latest I	ncentives	531
		16.5.1	Lower Taxes	536
		16.5.2	Lesser Fees	538
		16.5.3	Cheaper Labor	539
		16.5.4	More Preferences	540
		16.5.5	Greater Autonomy	541
		16.5.6	Simpler Formalities	542
	Refer	ences	-	546
17	V V/l	C C:	no foucier Francuis Contracts And Void	
17			no-foreign Economic Contracts Are Void	5 47
			dness Can Be Prevented	547
	17.1		ets Must Be Observed and Illegal Contracts Are Void	547
	17.2		el Fry" Incident: A Series of Illegal Contracts ets with Unqualified Parties Are Void	550 554
	17.3	17.3.1	1	334
		17.5.1	A Noncorporate Body Cannot Be a Party	555
		17.3.2	to a Foreign Economic Contract	555
		17.3.2	A Corporation That Is Prohibited by Law Cannot	555
		1722	Be a Party to a Foreign Economic Contract	555
		17.3.3	A Corporation Cannot Be a Party to a Sino-foreign	
			Economic Contract That Is Outside Its Registered	556
		1724	Business Scope	330
		17.3.4	At Present, Chinese Citizens Cannot Generally Act in Their Individual Status as Parties to Sino-foreign	
				550
	17.4	Contro	Economic Contracts	558
	17.4		ets with Illegal Contents Are Void	560 568
	17.5		ontracts Involving Hong Kong	308
	17.6		ing the Formation of Invalid Contracts	575
	D - f		ndling These Contracts	575
	Keier	ence		579
18	On th	ie Super	vision Mechanism of Chinese Foreign-Related	
	Arbit	tration a	nd Its Tally with International Practices	581
	18.1		ction	581
	18.2	Promul	gation of the Arbitration Law	582

xxiv Contents

	18.3			
			tion Supervision and Foreign-Related Arbitration	
			ision, and Some Pending Issues	584
	18.4		ussion on the Reasonableness of China's	
		Separate Legislation for Domestic and Foreign-Related		
		Arbitra	tion Supervision	591
		18.4.1	The Issue on Tallying Provisions Concerning	
			Foreign-Related Arbitration Supervision of Arbitration	
			Law with Those of Civil Procedure Law	592
		18.4.2	The Issue on Tallying Provisions Concerning	
			Foreign-Related Arbitration Supervision of Arbitration	
			Law with Those of International Treaties	596
		18.4.3	The Issue on Tallying Provisions Concerning	
			Foreign-Related Arbitration Supervision of Arbitration	
			Law with Those of Advanced Practices in Current	
			Arbitration Enactments of Other Countries	600
		18.4.4	The "Uniqueness" of China's Foreign-Related	
			Arbitration Supervision and the Necessity of Tallying	
			Its Supervision Mechanism with International	
			Treaties and Practices	608
	18.5	Some Io	deas on How to Strengthen	
			rent Chinese Foreign-Related Arbitration	
			ision Mechanism	618
	Refer	-		621
19	Ia En	fanaama	nt of Foucier Aubitual Arranda on Issue	
19			nt of Foreign Arbitral Awards an Issue	623
	19.1		ment and Improvement in China?	623
	19.1			023
	ν , ε		ernational Conventions Acceded	624
		19.2.1	Promulgating PRC's Civil Procedure Law	024
		19.2.1	(For Trial Use)	624
		10.2.2	Acceding to the New York Convention of 1958	624
		19.2.2 19.2.3		625
		19.2.3	Acceding to the Washington Convention of 1965	625
		19.2.4	Promulgating PRC's Civil Procedure Law (Formal)	626
	10.2		Promulgating PRC's Arbitration Law	627
	19.3	1993–P	Present: Judicial Explanations Added	627
			Obstacles from "Local Protectionism"	027
		19.3.2	"Double Report System" Preliminary Established:	620
		10.2.2	To Overcome the "Local Protectionism"	628
		19.3.3	"Double Report System" Strengthened: To Overcome	620
	10.4	D	the "Local Protectionism"	630
	19.4	Domesi	tic Legislations Need to Be Further Improved	630

Contents xxv

Part VI	Contemporary Chinese Practices on International Economic
	Disputes (Cases Analysis)

20 The Truth Among the Fogbound "Expropriation" Claim:					
	Comments on British X Investment Co. Versus British				
	Y Insurance Co. Case				
	20.1	0.1 Summary of the Case			
	20.2	Questions for Answers		637	
	20.3	Expert's Views and Opinions		638	
		20.3.1	In the CJV Contract Dated on 25 December 1996,		
			Which Aimed to Establish C Power Company,		
			the Provisions of Article 15 on Distribution of Profit		
			Were in Compliance with the Laws at That Time		
			and Have Been in Compliance with the Laws	638	
		20.3.2	For the "Circular [1998] No. 31" of the State Council		
			on Strengthening the Administration and Carrying on		
			Check of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Debt Issued		
			in September 1998, Its Legal Force Is Not Complete	639	
		20.3.3	The "Circular [1998] No. 31" Has No Legal Effect		
			of Retroactivity	641	
		20.3.4	Actually, the Aforesaid Prohibitive Provisions		
			in the "Circular [1998] No. 31" Have Been Amended		
			Again and Again in 2002 and 2004	643	
		20.3.5	"Circular [2002] No. 43" Is Not an "Expropriation		
			Decree"; New Agreements on 11 March 2003		
			Are Not "Behaviors of Expropriation"	646	
		20.3.6	Provisions in the Foreign Investment Regulations		
			and "Bilateral Investment Agreement Between PRC		
			and UK" Concerning the Expropriation of Foreign		
			Investment	650	
	20.4	Conclus	sion	652	
21	The A	nnrood	n of "Winning from Both Sides"		
41			Expropriation" Claim: Re-comments on British		
			Co. Versus British Y Insurance Co. Case	655	
	21.1		d [A1]	655	
	21.2		d [A2]	657	
	21.3		d [A3]	657	
	21.4		d [A4]	658	
	21.5		d [A5]	659	
	21.6		d [A6]	660	
	21.7		d [A7]	661	
	21.8		d [A8]	662	
	21.9		d [A9]	663	
	-1.7	ر کی ا سا	~ [>]	005	

xxvi Contents

	21.10 21.11 21.12 21.13 21.14	[Q11] a [Q12] a [Q13] a	and [A10]	663 664 665 669	
22	On the Serious Violation of Chinese Jus Cogens: Comments on the Case of Importing Toxic Brazilian Soybeans into China				
			d Opinion on Zhonghe Versus Bunge Case)	675	
	22.1		V of the Expert	676	
	22.2 22.3		ry of the Caseons Consulted	677 679	
	22.3		s Views and Opinions	680	
	22.5	-	onclusion	689	
			Official control of the control of t	690	
				070	
23			Prohibition on Importing Toxic Brazilian Soybeans		
			egal"?—A Rebuttal to Lawyer Song's Allegation	691	
	23.1		ural Unfairness	692	
	23.2		ty of Mr. Song	692	
	23.3		wers and Authority of AQSIQ	693	
	23.4		er Professor CHEN Is Qualified to Deal	711	
		with Er	glish Law	711	
24		-	of Inquiry into a Judgment: Comments		
	on the High Court Decision, 1993 No. A8176, in the Supreme				
	Court	_	Kong	717	
	24.1		ction	717	
	24.2 Brief Facts			718	
	24.3	- •	One to the Judgment: On the Jurisdiction of the Case	723	
		24.3.1	The Judgment Detained and Left the Jurisdiction		
			over the Case to the Court of Hong Kong, Obliterated		
			the Close Connections Among Contract A158,		
			Contract B, and Contract C, as Well as Those Between		
			Contract A158 and Bill of Exchange 10732C. It Thus		
			Thoroughly Violated the Legal Principles of	704	
		2422	"Autonomy of Will" and Pacta Sunt Servanda	724	
		24.3.2	The Judgment Detained and Left the Jurisdiction		
			over the Dispute of the Bill of Exchange to the Court		
			of Hong Kong and Refused to Stay the Proceedings of the Case, Thus Thoroughly Violating		
			the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance	729	
		24.3.3	The Judgment Detained and Left the Jurisdiction	149	
		47.3.3	over the Dispute of the Bill of Exchange to the Court		
			of Hong Kong and Refused to Stay the Proceedings		
			of the Case, Thus Thoroughly Violating the International		
			Treaty That Britain Has Acceded to and to Which		
			Hong Kong Is Legally Bound	731	

Contents xxviii

		24.3.4	The Judgment Detained and Left the Jurisdiction over the Dispute of the Bill of Exchange to the Court of Hong Kong, Thus Thoroughly Violating Universally Acknowledged International Practice	732
		24.3.5	The Judgment That Detained and Left the Jurisdiction over the Dispute of the Bill of Exchange to the Court of Hong Kong Is a Lack of Due Respect for Chinese Laws and Regulations That Tally with International Practice	734
	24.4	Query '	Two to the Judgment: On the Recognition in Chinese	
		Law of	the "Autonomy" of the Bill of Exchange Dispute	
		in This	Case	739
		24.4.1	There Does Not Exist in the Laws of China Such a Strange Expression of "The Autonomy of Bills of Exchange" and Absolute "Independence" of Bills	7.40
		24.42	of Exchange as Extremely Esteemed by Mr. Dicks	740
		24.4.2	Mr. Dicks' Citations from the Procedures for Bank	7.41
		24.4.2	Settlements of China Are Garbled and Out of Context	741
		24.4.3	When Citing Mr. Guo Feng's Article, Mr. Dicks Has	
			Emasculated Its Rerequisite and Garbled Its Original	7.40
		24.4.4	Meaning	743
		24.4.4	Mr. Dicks' Opinion Runs Counter to the Generally	
			Accepted Viewpoints of Chinese Academic Works	
			on Bill Laws, the Stipulations of Relevant International Convention, and the Bill Law of China	715
		24.4.5		745
		24.4.3	Mr. Dicks Has Distorted the Original Text When	
			Quoting the Civil Procedure Law of PRC as Evidence	748
	24.5	O	for the Said "Autonomy of Bills of Exchange" Three to the Judgment: On the Defendant's Right	/48
	24.5		ense in This Case	749
		24.5.1		750
		24.5.1		/30
		24.3.2	Denying Equal Right of Defense to the Defendant Is Against the Principle of Equity and International	
			Practice on Litigation Procedures	751
	24.6	Comolo		/31
	24.6		sion: The Judgment Based on the Presumptuously	
			ated Rules (Made by Mr. Kaplan and Mr. Dicks)	752
	D.f.		efinitely Lose All Its Legal Binding Effect	
	Keier	ences		752
Ann	ex			753
Ind	ex			781