Contents

Αc	know	ledgements	vii			
Int	roduc	tion	1			
		Aims and Structure of the Work				
		Time and offucture of the work				
1.	Law, Power, and Political Authority. On the Scope and					
		itations of the Work	17			
	I.	Introduction				
	II.	Brief Methodological Remarks				
	III.	The Province of the Problem Determined: What is Law?				
	IV.	Politics, Political Power, Political Authority				
	V.	From Powers to Power. The Familiar Tale of the Ineluctability				
		of the State	30			
		A. And its Two-pronged Critique: Isonomia and 'Early' States.				
	VI.	The Conditions of Existence of Political Authority: Insights				
		from the Theory of Normative Orders	36			
		,				
2.	The Dependence of Constitutional Democracy on the Distinction					
		veen Creation and Application of Law	43			
		Introduction				
	II.	The Contested Relationship between Law and Politics	47			
	III.	Law as <i>lex</i> and as <i>ius</i> : The Duality that Makes				
		Constitutionalism Possible	50			
	IV.	From Constitutions to Constitutionalism: Narrowing				
		the Focus of Constitutional Theory	55			
	V.	The (Proverbial) Tension between Democracy and				
		Constitutionalism	60			
	VI.	Modern Constitutionalism as 'Legal Otherness'				
	VII.	The Two-fold Justificatory Dependence of Constitutional				
		Democracy on the Idea of Application of Law	71			
		, 11				
3.	A C	ritical Evaluation of Moderate Legal Realism	80			
		Introduction				
		Realism vs Formalism				

	III.	Let Us be Realist about Adjudication. What do Judges Eat	
		for Breakfast?	85
	IV.	Realism and Realisms in Law: Meta-theory	87
	V.	The Lowest Common Denominator of Legal Realism	90
	VI.	The Two Axes of Rule-scepticism	93
		A. Radical-immanent Indeterminacy Thesis	94
		B. Radical-transcendental Indeterminacy Thesis	
		C. Moderate-immanent Indeterminacy Thesis	97
		D. Moderate-transcendental Indeterminacy Thesis	99
	VII.	The Unbearable Lightness of Moderate Scepticism	100
	VIII.	On the Normativity of Law, and On the Digestion of Judges.	110
4.	Towa	rds a Unified Account of Discretion in Law	116
	I.	Introduction	116
	II.	HLA Hart and the Concept of Discretion. Back to the	
		Future?	
	III.	Dworkin and the (Normative) No-Strong-Discretion Thesis	128
	IV.	Discretion as a Pervasive Feature of Kelsen's Stufenbaulehre	131
	V.	Discretion as Balancing in Klatt (and Alexy)	136
	VI.	The History of Discretion in the Administrative Domain	142
	VII.	Administrative Discretion in Germany	
	VIII.	Discretion in the French-Italian Administrative Tradition	149
	IX.	The Concept of Discretion in English Administrative Law	
	X.	Towards a Unified Account of Discretion in Law	158
		A. Normative Discretion	162
		B. Interpretive Discretion	165
	XI.	Conclusion	168
5.		and Language and as Language. An Alternative Picture	
	of a l	Multifaceted Relationship	169
	I.	Introduction	
	II.	The Communicative Model of Law. A Two-way Affair?	172
	III.	Beyond 'What is Said'. Speech-act Theory and the Rise	
		of Pragmatics in Legal Interpretation	178
	IV.	First Objection: Law as Language, Law and Language(s)	184
	V.	Second Objection: Speech-act vs Text-act Theory	190
	VI.	Legal Texts as 'Autonomous' Text-acts	195
	VII.	An Alternative Theory of Legal Meaning: Semantic	
		Minimalism	200
	VIII.	Prolegomena to a Theory of Legal Interpretation	205
	IX.	Conclusion	209

6.		tion and Application of Law. An Analytical Distinction	
	I. II.	Introduction The Two Extremes: Rejecting vs Assuming the Distinction	
	III.	Kelsen on the Relativity of the Distinction between Creation	213
	111.	and Application of Law	216
	IV.	Creation of Law: Of the Typicality of Legal Rules	
	V.	The Principle of Legality as a (Semantic) Meta-norm	219
	٧.	on Law-creation and Law-application	222
	VI.	Unpacking the Idea of 'Application of Law'	
	VI. VII.	The Potential Asymmetry between Norm-following and	22/
	V 11.	Norm-application	231
	VIII.	On the (Different) Normativity of Power-conferring Norms	
	IX.	Can only Officials Apply the Law?	
	Χ.	Form and Substance. Towards an Analytical Account of	207
	11.	Law-application	240
	XI.	Conclusion	
	XII.	PS One Final Objection: Interpretation, Interpretation,	
		Interpretation!	245
7.	The 9	Separation of Powers. A Meta-theoretical Reassessment	260
<i>,</i> •	I.	Introduction	
	II.	Genealogical Issues. When was the Separation of Powers	200
		'Invented'?	262
	III.	A Twofold Meta-theoretical Ambiguity Plaguing the	
		Discussion	265
	IV.	The Justificatory Debate. Monism vs Pluralism	
	V.	Critical Approaches	
	VI.	The Separation of Powers as a Formal Theory and as a	
		Normative Doctrine. On the Advantages of Maintaining	
		a Strict Distinction	277
		A. The Formal Theory of the Separation or Division	
		of Powers	278
		B. A Normative Doctrine of the Organisation of Political	
		Power Based on the Distinction between Law-creation	
		and Law-application	281
	VII.	Conclusion	287
Bil	bliogra	bhy	288
	dor		309