In 1993, we published a relatively short book, Monopsony: Antitrust Law and
Economics (Princeton University Press). At that time, although monopsony
had been a mainstay in the study of economics, the courts addressed it only
rarely. No doubt, this neglect was due at least in part to two things. First,
plaintiffs (and their lawyers) focused their attention on sellers, and, therefore,
monopsony did not come up. Second, the ill effects of monopsony
are
somewhat counterintuitive. There was a mistaken belief among some that
if monopsony power is used to lower prices, this must ultimately be beneficial
to consumers. In most instances, this is faulty economic reasoning.
This state of affairs was particularly difficult to understand since monopsony
conditions and behavior abounded even then. Moreover, monopsony
results in the same types of distributive and allocative issues raised by the
exercise of monopoly power.